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Summary
Turkey has long been considered a strategic U.S. and NATO ally.  That it
combines a predominantly Muslim identity with a secular democratic government has
added to Turkey’s significance to the United States since September 11, 2001.  
Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues concern U.S. policymakers, who
would like a stable, competent, friendly government in Ankara.  Since 1999, a
coalition of three parties of mismatched ideological preferences has presided over
unprecedented financial crises and the deepest recession in half a century.  On the
other hand, the coalition has produced an impressive legislative record of economic
and political reforms.  Some economic indicators, such as inflation and interest rates,
are showing improvement, but Turkey has yet to experience economic recovery.  As
an election nears, cleavages in the government may become more severe as coalition
partners jockey for position.  Other contenders are in opposition inside and outside
parliament.  Islamists may emerge from an election with strong support.  Two parties
have Islamist roots, but one of these is striving to be known as centrist rather than
Islamist, and it leads opinion polls. 
 
A number of foreign policy issues join U.S. and Turkish interests.  In the war
on terrorism, Turkey is playing a major role in Afghanistan, where it will assume
command of the international peacekeeping force.  Yet, Turkey is reluctant to see the
war expand to Iraq.  Turkey is a candidate for European Union membership, but has
not met the criteria for membership.  U.S. policymakers had maintained that
membership would anchor Turkey in the West.  Currently, the Administration wants
the EU, particularly Greece, and Turkey to resolve differences over a planned EU
rapid reaction force and its relationship to NATO. For its part, the EU wants Turkey
to help resolve the Cyprus issue.  Talks are underway, but no progress has been
reported.  Unless there is a resolution, Cyprus, as represented by the Greek-Cypriot
led government, is likely to be approved for EU membership and a crisis between the
EU and Turkey is possible, affecting Turkey’s EU prospects.  Lack of a resolution
on Cyprus also will complicate Greek-Turkish relations, which have seen a
rapprochement since 1999.  Cyprus and issues of Aegean sovereignty impede the full
normalization of relations between the two neighboring NATO allies.  Turkey’s
relations with countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia are important because of
their energy resources and U.S. interests in pipelines to transport them independently
of Iran and Russia.   The United States has encouraged the development of Turkey’s
ties to Israel since 1996.  Turkey and Israel have concluded major arms and water
deals, and their  relationship has withstood differences over Palestine.  
The United States has been Turkey’s main arms source and, after a three-year
hiatus, the United States resumed providing assistance to Turkey after September 11.
The amount of aid is expected to increase sharply in view of U.S. support for
Turkey’s command of peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan.   For its part, Turkey
would like U.S.-Turkish trade to get more attention.
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Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy
Introduction
Turkey is a country of strategic and symbolic value to U.S. policy.  It has been
a NATO ally since 1952 and, during the Cold War, it was the only NATO member
which bordered the Soviet Union.  After the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey
remained strategically important because of crises in the nearby Balkans, Caucasus,
and Middle East.  And, since the September 11, 2001 radical Islamist terrorist attacks
on the United States, Turkey’s significance has grown.  U.S. policymakers use
Turkey’s example to refute predictions of an imminent “clash of civilizations”
between the Muslim and Western worlds because Turkey’s Muslim identity has been
compatible with its secular, democratic government, role in NATO, and European
Union (EU) membership ambitions.  
Many issues concerning Turkey are related to U.S. policies.  First, in order to
advance an array of U.S. interests, the United States seeks a stable, friendly
government in Ankara that maintains its democratic character.  In part, this means
advocacy of political stability despite chronic chaotic, multiparty politics in Ankara.
And it also means caution regarding Islamist forces in Turkey -- both moderate ones,
which work within the political system, and radical ones, which perpetrate domestic
terrorist crimes.  Finally, it means attention to Turkey’s chronic economic crises
which have the potential to undermine its political stability. 
Many U.S. foreign policy interests concern Turkey.  They are led by the war on
terrorism, particularly on two fronts -- Afghanistan and Iraq.  Turkey, which has
participated with coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan, will assume command
of international peacekeeping forces there in June, and its support is viewed as
essential for any operation to unseat Saddam Hussein.  The United States also has an
abiding interest in Turkey’s European Union (EU) prospects because membership
could ensure Turkey’s stability and democracy and anchor it in the West.  Turkey’s
EU ambitions depend partly on its fulfillment of a rigorous reform agenda.  They also
may depend on Turkey’s relations with Greece and Cyprus, which are of concern to
an active Greek-American constituency.  An equally active Armenian-American
constituency is mindful of Turkey’s role in the Caucasus. The U.S. government is
interested in the region’s bountiful energy resources as well as in those in
neighboring Central Asia, and in pipelines that could transport that energy wealth
westward through Turkey.  Central Asia, many of whose people are ethnic kin of the
Turks, also is on the front line of the war on terrorism.
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1The President’s powers, including his veto power, are limited.  For example, if the
president vetoes legislation and the parliament passes it again unchanged, then the president
cannot veto it a second time.   He can, however, appeal to the Constitutional Court to
overturn the law.  Parliament has overridden several of Sezer’s vetoes. 
2See articles in Ortadogu, a newspaper that support the MHP, translations carried by Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) on line.
Domestic Issues
Government Effectiveness and Political Stability
In Turkey, the president is head of state and the prime minister is head of
government.  The current president is Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a former chief judge with
a reputation for integrity and belief in the rule of law.  Although very popular, Sezer’s
use of his position and constitutionally limited power has been controversial with the
political elite. His strict, legalistic interpretations and vetoes of legislation have
alienated political leaders, who appear intent on changing the Constitution to reduce
a president’s term in office from seven to five years.1  
Since spring 1999, the Turkish government has been a three-party coalition of
Prime Minister Bulent  Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP), Deputy Prime Minister
Devlet Bahceli’s Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and Deputy Prime Minister Mesut
Yilmaz’s Motherland Party (ANAP).  They control a comfortable majority in the
550-seat parliament, known as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and form the
longest serving government after a decade of instability.  The government’s agenda
has been unusually crowded and historic. Parliament has passed major
macroeconomic reforms in order for the government to obtain loans from
international financial institutions and thereby rescue the country from severe
economic crises.  (See Economic Situation, below.)  It also has passed many
constitutional amendments and several legislative packages of political reforms to
enable the country to enter negotiations for membership in the EU.  (See European
Union, below.)
The government’s ambitious and arduous workload has revealed sharp
differences among the coalition members, who are ideologically mismatched.  DSP
is traditionally, but perhaps no longer, statist and strongly nationalist.  MHP is right
wing and zealously nationalist.  ANAP is centrist, market-oriented, and worldly, with
a reputation for corruption.  Bahceli and Yilmaz differ sharply over changes required
for EU accession.  Yilmaz is pushing for rapid changes and compromises, while
Bahceli questions their compatibility with national sovereignty and argues for a
slower pace.  Although Bahceli and other MHP officials publicly claim that they
favor EU membership, their supporters regularly lambaste Yilmaz and the EU and
reports of arguments at cabinet meetings are common.2  
As time passes and another election nears, the strains are likely to worsen.
However, because most Turks blame them for the economic crises and the pain
inflicted by reforms, the coalition partners are likely to do poorly in a premature
election.  Thus, they probably will hold together until the economic situation
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improves and the voting public feels the improvement.  An election need not be held
until 2004, but Turkish governments generally do not serve out their full terms and
one is likely in 2003 if not before.  
Table 1. Parties, Leaders, Positions
Party Leader Position
Democratic Left Party (DSP)*3 Bulent Ecevit Center-Left
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)* Devlet Bahceli Right
Motherland Party (ANAP)* Mesut Yilmaz Center-Right
True Path Party (DYP) Tansu Ciller Center-Right
Felicity Party (SP) Recai Kutan Islamist
Justice and Development Party (AKP ) Tayyip Recep Erdogan Islamist
Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deniz Baykal Center-Left
Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) Mehmet Ali Bayar Center-Right
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) Murat Bozlak Kurdish
Waiting in the wings are several opposition parties.  The True Path Party (DYP)
led by former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller favors EU membership and joined forces
with other parties, including DSP and ANAP, to pass some EU-conforming
legislation over MHP’s objections.  On other issues, Ciller adopts populist positions
and opportunistically attacks the government.  For example, she joined forces with
the MHP to oppose abolition of the death penalty.  
There also are two Islamist parties in parliament.  (See also Role of Islamists,
below.) The Saadet or Felicity Party (SP) is the current incarnation of several banned
Islamist parties of followers of former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.  Because
Erbakan is banned from politics, SP is led by his ally Recai Kutan.  In August 2001,
members of a younger generation who disagree with Erbakan’s authoritarian
approach, led by  former Mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdogan, split from SP to
form the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Most preliminary public opinion
polls gauging the prospects of parties for the next election show AKP and Erdogan
in the lead.  In general, polls indicate that parties not in the government and not
viewed as responsible for the economic crises fare far better than the coalition
members; the latter may not reach the 10% of the vote threshold to enter parliament.
Two parties not now represented in parliament have political potential.  The
Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the party of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of
the Turkish Republic, and champion of secularism.  The 1999 national election
marked the first time that the CHP was unable to gain sufficient votes to enter
parliament.  CHP is led by Deniz Baykal, a divisive figure, who has alienated many
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4On April 4, 2002, the PKK renamed itself the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
(KADEK).  PKK leader  Ocalan was elected KADEK general chairman.  A spokesman said
that the group would focus on resolving the Kurdish issue by means of democratic
transformation, without changing borders of the countries in the region.  He declared, “the
armed struggle has ended.”  A. Kocgiri, et.al., KADEK’s Goal is Democratic Liberation,
Ozgur Politika, April 17, 2002, translation entered into FBIS on line, April 17, 2002. 
5For more, see Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, editors, Political Parties in Turkey, London,
Frank Cass, 2002.
6These actions included welcoming leaders of outlawed religious sects at his official
residence, allegedly staffing ministries and public agencies with Islamists, and attempting
to define Turkey more as part of the Islamic world than as part of the West.  He was alleged
to be supported by Iran, and made a notorious visit to Libya, during which he sat mute while
Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi lauded the Kurdish cause.
7For more detail, see CRS Report 97-462, Turkey’s Unfolding Political Crisis, April 11,
1997.
8 The European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in July 2001.
prominent leftist personalities.   The Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) was founded
by allies of former President Suleyman Demirel who were disenchanted with Ciller’s
leadership of DYP.  Mehmet Ali Bayar, an energetic former counselor at the Turkish
Embassy in Washington, returned home recently to become DTP leader.  Bayar’s
family is closely associated with the now 80-year-old Demirel, which may be both
an advantage and a handicap for Bayar. Demirel’s allies and family members have
been implicated in corruption scandals.   It remains to be seen if Bayar will redefine
the party or bring in new people.
Finally, the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) is the current incarnation of
several banned parties based in the largely Kurdish populated southeast of Turkey.
In the last regional elections, HADEP won control of 36 municipalities, including the
regional capital of Diyarbakir.  With only about 4.5% of votes in the 1999 national
election, however, it was unable to pass the threshold to enter parliament.  HADEP’s
leaders have been targeted for prosecution repeatedly because of their statements,
which the authorities consider “separatist” and  their alleged ties to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) or its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK is a
guerrilla/terrorist group that waged an insurgency, initially for Kurdish independence,
primarily in the southeast from 1984-1999.4  HADEP currently faces the threat of
banning, but remains popular.5
Role of Islamists
Turkey has had a series of Islamist parties, although their Islamism is not
claimed outright because the Constitution mandates the country’s secular character.
From June 1996 until June 1997, the Islamist Refah or Welfare Party (RP), under
Necmettin Erbakan, led a coalition government.  Some of Prime Minister Erbakan’s
actions6 troubled the military and secular elite, and they mobilized a public campaign
that brought about Erbakan’s resignation without an explicit coup.7  Refah was
banned in February 1998 for exploiting religion for political purposes.8   Erbakan was
banned from politics for five years, although he has been the power behind two
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9In the speech, he congratulated Afghanistan for forming an Islamic republic. 
10U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2000, April 30, 2001.
11U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001, Turkey, March 4, 2002.
subsequent Islamist parties, the Fazilet or Virtue Party (FP), banned in June 2001,
and the current Saadet or Felicity Party (SP).  Erbakan’s dominating style, however,
produced a split in Islamist ranks.  
Saadet is challenged by the breakaway Justice and Development Party (AKP)
led by the charismatic, former Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Erdogan
claims that he and the AKP are centrist, but he is a graduate of religious schools, his
wife wears a head scarf (a symbol of religious piety that, in Turkey, can also be a
political statement), and he has spoken against contraception and alcohol.  AKP
rhetoric supports Western ideals of democracy and human rights and backs Turkey’s
EU candidacy.  A January 2002 Constitutional Court decision ruled that Erdogan
could not found a party or run for parliament because of his 1999 conviction for
inciting hatred based on religion.  He had recited a poem deemed seditious in public,
and  served four months in jail for this conviction.  While Erdogan maintains that the
court decision does not affect his party leadership, it clearly prevents him from
becoming Prime Minister and clouds his political prospects.  Erdogan has been
ordered to stand trial anew on charges of insulting the military and inciting hatred
based on religion in a 1992 speech.9  He also is being investigated for embezzlement
and corruption during his tenure as mayor.  Deputy AKP leader Abdullah Gul now
heads the party’s parliamentary group.  
Turkey has been plagued by radical Islamist terrorism.  Turkey’s Hizbullah,
unrelated to the identically named Lebanese group, is believed to be a Kurdish Sunni
organization that targets other Kurds whom it deems to be religiously lax.   Turkish
authorities believe that Hizbullah has received some training from Iran and they have
taken strong measures to suppress the movement.10
Human Rights 
In recent decades, Turkey has had a poor human rights record.  Abuses related
to the war against Kurdish insurgents have declined sharply since 1999, when PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured.  Only a low level of violence has persisted for
the past three years and, with the decline in violence, the human rights situation has
improved.  Nonetheless, the U.S. State Department’s most recent human rights report
describes several remaining problem areas.11  For example, four provinces, where
many abuses occur, remain under state of emergency decrees which give
authoritarian powers to governors. (At the height of the insurgency, 11 provinces
were governed in that way.)  The State Department report describes extrajudicial
killings, such as deaths due to excessive use of force and torture, widespread use of
torture, and beatings and other abuses by security forces, especially during
incommunicado detention and interrogation.  Yet the situation apparently is
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12Claudia Parsons, Council of Europe says Torture declining in Turkey, Reuters, April 24,
2002.
13See also, CRS Report RS20842, Turkey: Financial Crises in Context, March 13, 2001.
14Turkish State Statistics Institute.  
15 It has been credibly posited, however, that long-term, neglected structural problems, and
not the government’s actions, were the true cause of the economic crises in 2000 and 2001.
improving.  In April 2002, a Council of Europe delegation reported that torture
appeared “to be far less frequent than in the past.”12
Prison conditions overall are poor.  There are limitations on freedoms of
expression and association, and some restrictions on religious minorities.  Violence
against women persists as does abuse of children.   
Many of the constitutional amendments passed in October 2001 and two
packages of “harmonization” laws passed in February and March 2002 to make
Turkey more compatible with the European Union are intended to improve human
rights.    A new civil code will greatly improve the rights of women.  Other laws limit
the practice of banning political parties, reduce some restrictions on the press, and
require measures be taken against torture. More legislation is needed, and it is not yet
clear how the array of new laws will be implemented. 
Economic Situation13
The decline in the economy in 2001 was the worst in over half a century.
Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.4%, while inflation rose to 68.5%,
and the Turkish currency, the lira, lost 60% of its value.  GDP per capita dropped
from about $2,900 to $2,100.14   The government forecasts 3% real growth in GNP
and an annual inflation rate of 35% for 2002. 
The government is unpopular mainly because it has sparked economic crises and
presided over harsh remedies.15  In December 1999, the government launched an
ambitious economic program to conquer chronically high inflation with the help of
a $4 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby credit.   The government’s
implementation of reforms, however, was uneven and slow.  When combined with
banking scandals, this produced a lack of investor and public confidence and a severe
liquidity crisis in November 2000.  The IMF stepped in with another $7.5 billion in
loans, but the government retained a pegged exchange rate regime too long and, in
spite of the adverse financial situation, still delayed critical economic decisions.  In
February 2001, a publicized tiff between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer
provoked another drop in investor confidence, a massive capital flight, and another,
worse financial crisis.
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17Talk at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 22,2002.
Basic Facts
Population 67 million
Ethnic Groups Turkish 80%
Kurdish 20%
Gross Domestic Product 
Real Growth Rate -7.4% (2001)
Inflation 68.1% (2001)
Unemployment 8.4% (2001)
External Debt $106 billion (2000)
Exports apparel, foodstuffs,
textiles, metal manufactures
Imports machinery, chemicals, semi-
finished products, fuels
Major Trading Partners
Exports Germany, United States,
United Kingdom, Italy,
France
Imports Germany, Italy, US. Russia,
France, UK
Sources: World Factbook 2001, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, November
2001 and April 2002, Turkish State Statistics Institute
regular reporting.
To restore confidence and thereby secure additional international financing,
Ecevit recruited former World Bank Vice President Kemal Dervis, a Turkish
national, to be Minister of
State in charge of the economy
to handle reforms.  Dervis
shepherded many major
initiatives through parliament,
including the restructuring of
state banks; formation of an






transparency.  The central
bank is tasked with combating
inflation above all else.
Reassured, the IMF and World
Bank together agreed in May
2001 to provide another $15.7
billion in support. 
 Improvement in the
economy was slowed by the
detrimental effects of post
S e p t e m b e r  1 1 ,  2 0 0 1
developments on tourism and
exports -- sectors that the
government had counted on to
spur growth.  Turkey needed
more money to repay loans
due in 2002 and concluded another three-year standby agreement with the IMF for
2002-2004 for $16.2 billion (including $12 billion in new funds plus $4.2 billion in
carry-over loans) contingent on more reforms.  Turkey thus became the IMF’s largest
debtor.  A new Letter of Intent to the IMF has presented a program that includes
increasing the primary budget surplus to 6.5% of Gross National Product (GNP),
exercising greater control over budgets and hiring at State Economic Enterprises
(SEEs), ensuring the independence of the Central Bank, moving to inflation
targeting, reducing the number of state banks and their staffs, developing a
recapitalization scheme for state banks, and other reforms.16   As of April 2002,
interest rates and inflation were decreasing.  Dervis continues to predict
optimistically that a resumption of growth is imminent.17
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18Foreign direct investment in Turkey is the lowest in Europe and lower than in some
developing countries.
19Turkey has never defaulted on its debts, even as it failed to fulfill the requirements of
economic reform programs.
20The 77-year-old Ecevit was hospitalized twice in May 2002.
21For background see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Concerns, updated March 26, 2002. 
Many other economic reforms are still needed, experts believe, and some of
those passed still await implementation.  Perhaps most important, Turkey needs to
increase foreign direct investment (FDI) to obtain capital to spur growth.  To do this,
its bureaucratic investment process has to be streamlined and the fight against
corruption has to continue, analysts argue.18  The government also must convince
investors of its consistency and commitment to the economic reform  program.
Investors want assurance that the government will be able to hold the line especially
as an election nears.  They doubt the government’s commitment, despite a year of
substantial reforms, and many maintain that 17 prior IMF programs failed primarily
due to politicians’ populist propensities.  Skeptics point out that some officials seem
to question the reforms or speak as if they do not understand them or the economy,
and worry that reforms lack a constituency even among those who had approved
them, let alone among the wider population.19  Finally, although this government has
been relatively long-lasting, its stability continues to be of concern to investors
weighing political risks.  At times, the physical health of the frail prime minister acts
as a barometer for the markets.20   The IMF is attempting to help generate confidence
by frequent reviews of government performance and monitoring of reforms before




Afghanistan.21   After September 11, 2001, Turkey voted in NATO to invoke
Article 5 of the defense treaty and joined the coalition to fight Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban regime.  Within 24 hours, Turkey provided U.S. forces access to its air space.
It also provided intelligence based on its long relationship with the Uzbek-Tajik-
Hazera Afghan Northern Alliance.  Turkey sent a general to U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida, another liaison team to the  European
Command (EUCOM) in Germany, and 90 special forces troops to Afghanistan to
train Northern Alliance forces.  Turkish ships in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas
shadowed, interdicted, and boarded suspect vessels.  All U.S. humanitarian flights
destined for Afghanistan to drop the meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) flew from air bases
in Turkey.
After the ouster of the Taliban, Turkey sent 267 troops to join the 5,000-man
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping operation under
British command.  Turkey also blocked funding for Al-Qaeda by freezing the assets
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of people and companies linked to Osama bin Laden and associated groups in Egypt,
Libya, Uzbekistan, and Somalia.  Turkish border authorities arrested Al-Qaeda
operatives allegedly en route from Iran to perpetrate terrorist attacks in Israel.22  They
also arrested Turkish Al-Qaeda suspects attempting to return from Afghanistan.
Turkey allowed U.S. flights transporting Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to transit its territory.  Turkey has undertaken
to train a 600-man National Guard battalion of Afghans and provide them with
uniforms and equipment and has trained 20 new Afghan diplomats.  It hopes to play
a major part in the reconstruction of the country.
The United States and Britain, seeking to have a Muslim country take on a
prominent role in the war against terrorism and disabuse Muslims of the notion that
the war is against them, have urged Turkey to assume the ISAF command.  Turkey
posed several conditions.  It wanted ISAF’s mission to continue to be limited to
Kabul and not to expand to all of Afghanistan.  It wanted  ISAF to continue to be
made up primarily of familiar NATO forces, and  not forces from varied Muslim
countries unused to working together.  It wanted assurances of continued intelligence,
logistical, and communications support.  And most critically, Turkey needed
adequate funding because it could not afford to undertake the mission out of its own
limited resources.  Turkey’s conditions reportedly were met, and it will assume
command for six months in June 2002. With command, Turkey will increase the size
of its contingent up to an estimated  1,500 men.
Some critics question the appropriateness of Turkey’s assumption of the ISAF
command, noting its close ties to ethnic kin in Afghanistan, especially Uzbeks led by
warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum, whose family still lives in Turkey.  They
wonder if other ethnic groups will accept Turks as impartial arbiters or if Turks will
be able to act impartially in an ethnically charged setting.  Other critics argue that
Turkish armed forces have not respected human rights at home and would be
inappropriate examples for the Afghans.  As noted above, however, the human rights
situation in Turkey may be improving and, of the Turkish security forces, the military
has attempted to address its deficiencies in this area  more than others, such as the
police.  Still others believe that Turks lack experience in leading a peacekeeping
operation.  However, as will be noted below, the Turkish armed forces have served
in many international peacekeeping operations and assumed command of
peacekeepers in Somalia from U.S. forces without incident.
Iraq.  Turkey opposes expansion of the war against terrorism to Iraq.  This
opposition is motivated by concern for Iraq’s territorial integrity, not for Saddam
Hussein.  Turkey believes that the post Gulf War power vacuum in northern Iraq
created an environment that enabled the PKK to find safe havens and escalate its war
in Turkey.   Turkey fears that a new war could lead to a power vacuum, the partition
of Iraq and the birth of a Kurdish state in the north that could serve as a model for
Turkish Kurdish separatists seeking their own state in southeast Turkey. 
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Turkey’s opposition is also motivated by economic concerns.  Before the Gulf
War, Turkey closed its border with Iraq, then one of its major  trading partners, and
abided by international sanctions on Baghdad.  Turkish officials estimate the cost of
the closure at $30 to $60 billion, depending on their audience, and argue that the
international community never compensated Turkey for its losses.  As a result of the
U.N.’s humanitarian “oil-for-food” program begun in December 1996 and of a semi-
illicit trade in Iraqi diesel and crude oil, bilateral Iraqi-Turkish trade now totals about
$1 billion annually.  (The United States waives sanctions on Turkey for the illicit
energy traffic.)  The two neighbors hope to reach pre-Gulf War trade levels of about
$2.5 billion annually, and Turkey does not want to see this positive trend reversed.
It has not addressed the idea that economic relations with a post-Saddam Iraq might
be even better.  Turkey has had an ambassador in Baghdad since 1997.  
Since the Gulf War, Turkey has allowed U.S. and British planes to enforce a no-
fly zone over northern Iraq (Operation Northern Watch)  to protect Iraq’s Kurds from
Saddam Hussein and monitor the movement of his armed forces.  Turkey has
developed a modus vivendi with the two major Iraqi Kurdish groups -- the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- but it does
not trust their assurances that they do not want independence.  Some Turkish
observers, however, acknowledge that the Iraqi Kurds already have established a de
facto state in northern Iraq, with institutions and infrastructure.
Finally, Turkey does not find U.S. scenarios for Saddam Hussein’s replacement
credible and is particularly skeptical about the prospects of the U.S.-backed
opposition Iraqi National Congress.23  Attempting to pre-empt U.S. action, Prime
Minister Ecevit urged  Saddam to allow the return of U.N. inspectors, but Saddam
reportedly responded rudely.24
Despite all of these doubts, some believe that Turkey, because it is a faithful
U.S. ally, and also because it is indebted to the United States for its help at the IMF,
will, in the end, support U.S. efforts to overthrow Saddam. Some maintain that if the
Administration fulfills promises of consultation with Turkish leaders ahead of any
action and chooses a time that mitigates effects on the Turkish economy, such as
avoiding tourism season, support would be more likely than not to materialize.
European Union Membership
At its December 1999 summit in Helsinki, the EU formally recognized Turkey’s
candidacy for membership, but put Turkey in a category separate from 12 other
candidate countries.  The EU began accession negotiations with the others, but not
with Turkey, which has not met the so-called Copenhagen criteria for membership.
The criteria require that a candidate achieve:
! stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and respect for and protection of minorities;
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! the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
! the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to
the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.
If Turkey manages to complete the wide range of economic reforms it has
undertaken since 2000 to fulfill agreements with the International Monetary Fund,
it will be on the way to meeting the economic criteria for membership.25
However, the EU also demands many political reforms of Turkey -- from
ensuring the independence of the judiciary, to ending torture, reforming the prison
system, and allowing greater freedom of expression, the press, association, and
assembly.26  European officials seem to emphasize three reforms: abolition of the
death penalty, cultural rights for Kurds, and limitation of the role of the military in
politics.  According to its March 2001, National Program, or policy agenda for
achieving membership, Turkey promised to abolish the death penalty in the medium
term or within three years.  It knows that it cannot be admitted to the EU while
retaining the death penalty. Parliament has amended the Constitution to abolish the
death penalty, except for terrorism and crimes against the state.  Additional
legislation to implement this change is needed, but that still will not fulfill the EU
requirement.
Debate on the issue continues, but it is not a debate about the death penalty per
se, which has not been carried out since 1984.  It is a debate about the fate of PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan, the most notorious Turk on death row.  Turks blame Ocalan
for waging a war from 1984-1999 and causing more than 30,000 deaths.  He was
captured in February 1999,  tried for treason, and sentenced to death in June 1999.
However, with the EU looking over its shoulder, the government delayed requesting
parliament to approve his execution pending his appeal to the European Court of
Human Rights, which still has not ruled.  A member of the governing coalition, the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the opposition True Path Party (DYP) seem to
be insisting that Ocalan be executed before the death penalty is abolished.   They
sometimes voice their demand in terms of  “terrorists,” not Ocalan, but Turks know
to whom they are referring.
In the cultural field, the EU requires that citizens be afforded access to education
and media in their mother tongues.  Many Turks view this demand, which has been
voiced by the PKK and its sympathizers, as encouraging Kurdish separatism.  A
compromise on media broadcasts may authorize government networks to broadcast
in Kurdish in regions with large Kurdish populations.  State institutions might also
play a role in Kurdish education, although this compromise has not advanced as far
as that on broadcasts and there is a Constitutional impediment to overcome.  There
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is no national consensus on the issues.  Ecevit agrees with state broadcasting, but
opposes Kurdish education.  Some ANAP leaders propose allowing private schools
to offer Kurdish courses. MHP opposes Kurdish broadcasts and education. 
Even more difficult is limiting the role of the military, whose influence has been
great since the founding of the republic.  Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu has
lowered his profile by declining to meet visiting civilian officials and making fewer
public comments.27  One of the new constitutional amendments changed the
composition of the National Security Council so that civilians outnumber military
members five to four.  The NSC immediately implemented the change.  But numbers
are not the same as influence, and the NSC decides by consensus not by vote.  The
commanders view fundamentalism (called reactionism in Turkey) and separatism,
broadly defined, as the two main threats to the state.  They make pronouncements on
these dangers and criticize politicians for their laxity in combating them.  They
routinely voice opinions on matters that, in EU countries, would be beyond their
purview.  History and tradition still lead civilian officials to defer to military
commanders.   It remains to be seen if both civilians and the military wish to or can
change their conduct.
Finally, although not a Copenhagen criterion, the issue of Cyprus has
complicated Turkeys’ prospects for EU membership. (See below.) 
Turkey is seeking to have the EU set a date for starting accession negotiations
by the end of 2002, arguing that it would encourage and accelerate reforms.  EU
officials unanimously insist that the Copenhagen criteria be met first.
Many Turks are skeptical about the changes required by the EU, believing that
they threaten the country’s character and territorial integrity.  The EU, in turn, has
spoken and unspoken doubts about granting membership to Turkey.  If admitted,
Turkey would soon be the largest country in the EU, with a young and growing
population.  It would have a right to proportionate representation on the EU
Commission and in the EU Parliament.  And, although a decline in emigration from
new members accompanied previous EU enlargements, European countries are
fearful of being inundated by Turkish migrants or workers who would have free
movement as citizens of an EU country.  In addition, Turkey has a large agricultural
sector, which might threaten some in Europe with comparable strengths.  And,
Turkey is 98% Muslim, while EU countries are predominantly Christian in
background.  This has led some Europeans to be uneasy about what Turkey’s
accession would mean to their sense of identity and to EU cohesion.28  Finally, if
Turkey were admitted, then the EU would border Iraq, Iran, and Syria, causing some
unease in European circles.  
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Despite these concerns, many observers believe that the EU is committed
politically to Turkish membership, but view it as at least a decade away.  However,
Turkey obtained candidacy when the major EU member states were governed by
social democrats.  If the political pendulum in Europe swings rightward, as seems to
be occurring, opposition to Turkey’s membership might become stronger and more
outspoken.29
European Security and Defense Policy.  The EU plans to create a 60,000-
man rapid reaction force for use in humanitarian missions and peacekeeping, and
seeks access to NATO planning, intelligence, and other assets.  Turkey, a member
of NATO, but not of the EU,30 threatened to veto the EU’s use of NATO resources
unless it was allowed to participate in the EU’s defense decision-making.  The EU
would not permit a non-EU member to take part in its decisions.  The stalemate
continued until the United States and Britain mediated a compromise in November
2001.  The resulting as yet unpublished “Ankara agreement” reportedly provides that
the European force would not be used in a conflict between EU and NATO members.
This assuaged Turkey’s concern that the EU  might intervene in possible Greek-
Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean.  In addition, representation of non-EU
NATO members to EU defense decision-making bodies would be upgraded and
consultation would be “flexible,” meaning that Turkey could request talks concerning
and participation in EU missions that could affect its security interests.  In return, the
EU will have assured access to NATO planning capabilities and presumed access to
NATO (mostly U.S.) assets, such as strategic lift and satellite intelligence.31
 Greece refuses to accept the “Ankara agreement,” charging that Britain was not
authorized to negotiate with Turkey and the United States, two non-EU members, on
behalf of the EU, and that the agreement contravenes previous EU arrangements.
Athens insists that the Ankara document be modified to provide for autonomous EU
decision-making.  It  rejects procedural bypasses.  In the near term, the Greek
government is unlikely to relent because it and the domestic opposition are using the
issue politically and the opposition is ascendant in the polls.  Underlying this is the
long-term belief of many Greeks that  EU autonomy  in its implementation of ESDP
would mean that Europe would side with Greece in a confrontation with Turkey.
Turkey maintains the issue is now one for NATO and the EU to resolve with Greece,
and will not accept changes to the Ankara accord.  The lack of a resolution may
prevent the EU’s assumption of its first peacekeeping operation in the neighboring
Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia (FYROM), scheduled for September 2002.
Currently NATO commands the FYROM force. 
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Cyprus.32  Although not a Copenhagen criterion, the EU wants a settlement on
the island of Cyprus.  Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided between Greek Cypriots
who reside in the southern two-thirds of the island and constitute the internationally
recognized government and Turkish Cypriots who control the northern part of the
island and have their own government, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC), recognized only by Turkey.  The EU has said that while it would prefer to
admit a united Cyprus, it will admit Cyprus regardless of a settlement.  The Cyprus
that accedes to the EU in that eventuality would be the Greek-Cypriot government,
without Turkish-Cypriot participation.  If that happens, Turkey has threatened to
annex the north and warned of a crisis; but what Ankara would, in fact, do is
uncertain because a crisis could scuttle Turkey’s own EU prospects.  The EU is
expected to approve Cyprus’s accession in December 2002.
The United States, European Union, United Nations, and Turkey seek to avert
a crisis on this issue.  All have pressured the parties to return to the negotiating table
after over a three-year pause.  Direct talks between Cypriot President Glafcos
Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash began in January 2002.  The
parties and outside observers believe that they will soon know if a breakthrough is
possible.
Greece.  Turkey and Greece have had troubled relations almost since Greece
gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830.  In more recent times, the
two NATO allies have differed over Cyprus and over the sovereignty of Aegean Sea
territorial seas, continental shelf, airspace, and islands.   In 1987 and 1996, they came
to the brink of war over Aegean issues.33  Only U.S. diplomatic intervention avoided
war in 1996.34  
Changes in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations are underway.   In spring 1999,
Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail
Cem reached out to each other and began a rapprochement.  Their initiatives were
assisted by an outpouring of popular goodwill and sympathy after devastating
earthquakes hit both countries in August and September 1999.  Greece’s decision to
allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December confirmed
a change in relations. Since then, positive developments have continued.  The two
governments have signed numerous agreements for cooperation on so-called “lesser”
issues: maritime trade, economy, science and technology, customs and culture,
organized crime and terrorism, environmental protection, education, illegal
immigration, and agriculture.  They have agreed to jointly conduct seismic research
in the Aegean, combat Mediterranean anemia, and become parties to the Ottawa
Convention to prohibit antipersonnel land mines, and to eliminate land mines in their
border regions in Thrace. Greece and Turkey submitted a joint bid to co-host the
2008 European soccer championship.  The two foreign ministries have established
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a telephone “hot line.”  In talks with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the
two allies agreed to a confidence-building measure to notify each other of their
schedules for military exercises. Bilateral trade topped $700 million in 2001.  Rail
service will be opened from Izmir and Istanbul in Turkey to Thessaloniki and Athens
in Greece.  Finally, Turkey and Greece have agreed to construct a natural gas pipeline
from Bursa in Turkey to Komotini in Greece that will be used to ship gas from Iran
to Europe. 
The above accords may help to create a foundation for a more lasting resolution
of major issues. On March 12, 2002, the two neighbors began exploratory talks, i.e.,
talks to decide on the parameters of talks, on Aegean issues.  Turkey’s “roadmap” to
EU membership requires it to resolve border disputes with its neighbors or take them
to the International Court of Justice by 2004.  This requirement undoubtedly is the
catalyst for the talks.
Although three years old, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement remains a fragile
infant.  Skeptics abound and, at times, the new relationship appears to be one of two
foreign ministers and not of two peoples.  Polls indicate that Greeks and Turks
continue to view each other as their foremost threat.  Members of the foreign
ministers’ own parties and governments have criticized their efforts.  Especially in
Greece, the opposition party and the media seem not to believe that progress has been
made or in Turkey’s good will.  Some Turkish nationalists also do not believe in the
rapprochement, or they share the view of Greece’s encouragement of Turkey’s EU
path as a Greek/European conspiracy to weaken Turkey.
Caucasus and Central Asia.  Turkey has good relations with Georgia and
with the ethnically related Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  Turkey has trade and
military ties with Georgia and welcomes the recent U.S. initiative to train and equip
the Georgian armed forces to fight terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge.  Turkey’s
determination to become an energy and transit bridge from Central Asia and the
Caucasus to Europe is its main policy motivation in the region.35  Turkey and
Azerbaijan have joined with international partners to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean
coast beginning in summer 2002 and a natural gas pipeline from the Azerbaijani field
at Shah Deniz via Georgia to Turkey beginning about the same time. Turkey and the
United States hope that Kazakhstan will eventually choose to use the BTC instead
of an Iranian route to ship its oil westward.  
Turkey’s relations with Armenia are troubled.  Turkey recognized Armenia’s
independence in 1991, but never established diplomatic ties because Yerevan failed
to meet its conditions. Ankara insists that Armenia drop an international campaign
for recognition of what Armenians refer to as their national genocide at the hands of
the Turks from 1915 to 1923 and repudiate claims to Turkish territory.  Further,
Ankara demands that Armenians withdraw from the 20% of Azerbaijani territory that
they conquered in a war to gain independence for the predominantly Armenian-
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inhabited Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh.36  For its part, Yerevan wants Turkey
to end a blockade of Armenia and Karabakh that it imposed out of sympathy with
Azerbaijan, and to drop all conditions for diplomatic relations.  Although the
genocide issue is the major problem dividing the neighbors, Ankara would probably
not break ranks with Azerbaijan for the sake of Armenia because of ethnic ties and
the valuable energy connection.
Israel.37  Agreements reached in the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1993 to
1995 made relations between Israel and Muslim Turkey more acceptable in Turkey
and the region.  Those relations have blossomed since a February 1996 military
cooperation agreement.  Since then, high ranking civilian and military officials have
exchanged visits; regular, semiannual strategic talks have been held; and Turkey
chose Israel firms to upgrade its  F-4 and F-5 fighter planes and M-60A1 tanks and
well as for other arms purchases.  With U.S. permission, the two countries are
discussing joint production of Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missiles.   They also are
discussing co-production of Popeye-2 air to surface missiles.  The United States,
Turkey, and Israel hold periodic trilateral air and naval exercises.  On the civilian
side, bilateral trade totaled $1.3 billion in 2001, and  tourism and cultural and
academic exchanges have increased.  Most recently, Israel agreed to purchase water
from Turkey.  
Turkish public opinion sympathizes with the Palestinians,  and Turks protested
Israel’s actions against the Palestinians in its “war on the terrorism infrastructure,”
launched on March 29, 2002.  Turkish-Israeli relations were rocked on April 4, 2002,
when Prime Minister Ecevit referred to Israel’s actions as a ‘genocide’ and harshly
criticized Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.   The next day, Ecevit claimed that his
use of the word had led to interpretations he did not intend and said, “We attach great
importance to our relations with Israel.”38   He later regretted the “misunderstanding.”
Foreign Minister Cem declared that Turkey’s relations with Israel were separate from
the Middle East problem.  Some members of the Turkish military defended Israel’s
actions. Nonetheless, Israel protested, as did American-Jewish organizations, who
had joined with Turkey in 2000 in opposition to a Congressional resolution to
commemorate the Armenian genocide.39  The U.S.-based groups sent Ecevit  letters
of complaint.40 Turkey’s ambassador to Washington convened a meeting with
representatives of American-Jewish groups, which they characterized as positive.
Nonetheless, there has been some residual resentment in America.  Israel and Turkey
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want the incident to pass rapidly because Israeli-Turkish relations have become so
important that neither wants them to be detrimentally affected.  Thus, Israel has
welcomed the idea of holding a Middle East peace conference in Turkey and Turkish
officials have said that they would be happy to host it.  
Other Issues.  Turkey has supported many recent U.S. policies through
deployments of its armed forces.  It has a 705-man battalion serving in SFOR, the
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 1,065-man battalion in KFOR in
Kosovo, and  a military police squad and an infantry unit, totaling 79 men, in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  Turkey has sent military
observers to Kuwait and East Timor.  Turkey participates in the Temporary
International Peacekeeping Force in the West Bank city of Hebron (TIPH) and
suffered a casualty there in March 2002.  Turkey participates in the U.S-initiated
Southeastern Europe Multinational Peacekeeping Brigade (SEEBRIG) along with six
other Balkan countries, which have conducted joint military training. A Turkish
brigadier general served as the first commander of SEEBRIG, which was created in
September 1998.  Turkey supports the candidacies of Romania and Bulgaria to join
NATO.
U.S. Policy
Executive.  Administrations generally have followed policies that appreciate
Turkey’s strategic importance; encourage its democratic, secular character; seek
improvements in human rights practices; and support its economic reforms. 
Given Turkey’s strategic importance and its role in peacekeeping operations of
significance to U.S. policy, security relations are a high priority.  There are regular
Defense Department consultations with Turkey,  and the United States is Turkey’s
main arms supplier.  Between 1993 and 2000, the United States signed agreements
to sell Turkey $5.17 billion in arms, making Turkey the first- or second-ranking
European purchaser in each year of that period.41  Although the economic crises have
led to a lengthening of the Turkish armed forces’ procurement schedule, purchases
are proceeding.  In May 2002, Turkey agreed to buy six Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACs) planes from Boeing.  A contract with Bell-Textron for the
first installment of attack helicopters, inordinately long in negotiations, is expected
to be concluded soon and may be submitted for congressional approval in late 2002.42
Economic ties are of increasing importance.  The United States contributes
about 32% of IMF finances and has used its influence to support IMF loans for
Turkey since 1999 as well as tighter monitoring of Turkey’s performance.   Turkey
would like more attention paid to bilateral trade.  A U.S.-Turkey Economic
Partnership Commission was created to address this desire.  During Prime Minister
Ecevit’s January 2002 visit to Washington, the Administration offered to include
Turkey in the Israel-Jordan qualified industrial zones (QIZ’s) agreement and work
on this is progressing.  Goods produced in QIZ’s enter the United States duty free.
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1990 $60.0 $0.4 $503.4 $563.8
1991 $14.3 $0.4 $501.2 $515.9
1992 $250.0 $0.4 $553.7 $804.1
1993 $200.0 $0.4 $453.1 $653.5
1994 $0.0 $0.4 $406.0 $406.4
1995 $165.7 $0.4 $329.2 $495.3
1996 $33.5 $0.4 $321.1 $355.0
1997 $22.3 $0.5 $176.5 $199.3
1998 $8.1 $0.5 $0.0 $8.6
1999 $3.3 $0.5 $1.5 $5.3
2000 $0.0 $0.0 $1.6 $1.6
2001 $0.0 $0.0 $1.7 $1.7
2002 $0.0 $0.0 $2.7 $2.7
2002 $200.0 $0.0 $28.0 $228.0
2003 $0.0 $0.0 $20.3 $20.3
* Compiled by Larry Nowels, Specialist in Foreign Affairs,
April 18, 2002.
The Administration exempted Turkey from increased tariffs imposed on imported
steel in March 2002.  The Administration is unlikely, however, to lower textile
quotas as Turkey wants (textiles are Turkey’s number one export) because of concern
about political opposition from textile-producing states. 
Congress. Congress has long been interested in Turkey.  Much interest has
been critical, with resolutions often addressing concerns of Greek-Americans about
Cyprus or Aegean Sea sovereignty issues or Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish
population.  Because of concerns for regional stability and possible use of U.S. arms
in abusing human rights, Congress sometimes has scrutinized or impeded U.S. arms
sales to Turkey.  More recently, some Members have introduced resolutions to
express appreciation of Turkey’s role in the war on terrorism or its relations with
Israel. 
Assistance.  Turkey was a long-term, major recipient of U.S. foreign aid
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11, 2001 attacks, how-
ever, Turkey received
$20 million in FMF from
the Emergency Response
Fund.  For FY2003, the
Administration requested
$17.5 million in FMF
and $2.8 million in
IMET.  Also, on March
19, 2002, Vice President
Cheney said that the Ad-
ministration would pro-
vide Turkey with $200
million in ESF and $28 million in FMF to help defray the costs to Turkey of
assuming leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan.  These funds are part of the
Administration’s request for FY2002 supplemental appropriations.
